It is now recognized that the Consensus problem is a fundamental problem when one has to design and implement reliable asynchronous distributed systems. This chapter is on the Consensus problem. It studies Consensus in two failure models, namely, the Crash/no Recovery model and the Crash/Recovery model. The assumptions related to the detection of failures that are required to solve Consensus in a given model are particularly emphasized.
Introduction
Distributed applications are pervading many aspects of everyday life. Booking-reservations, banking, electronic and point-of-sale commerce are noticeable examples of such applications. Those applications are built on top of distributed systems. When building such systems, system designers have to cope with two main issues: asynchrony and failure occurrence. Asynchrony means that it is impossible to de ne an upper bound on process scheduling delays and on message transfer delays. This is due to the fact that neither the input load from users nor the precise load of the underlying network can be accurately predicted. This means that whatever is the value used by a process to set a timer, this value can not be trusted by the process when it has to take a system-wide consistent decision. Similarly, failure occurrences can not be predicted. The net e ect of asynchrony and failure occurrences actually create an uncertainty on the state of the application (as perceived by a process) that can make very di cult or even impossible to determine a system view shared by all non-faulty processes. The mastering of such an uncertainty is one of the main problems that designers of asynchronous systems have to solve.
As a particular example, let us consider the case of a service whose state has been distributed on several nodes. To maintain a consistent copy of the service state, each node must apply to its copy the same sequence of the updates that have been issued to modify the service state. So, there are two problems to solve. (1) Disseminate the updates to the nodes that have a copy of the service state. And (2) , apply the updates in the same order to each copy. The rst problem can be solved by using a reliable multicast primitive 18] . The second problem is more di cult to solve. The nodes have to agree on a common value, namely, the order in which they will apply the updates. This well known problem (namely, the Atomic Broadcast problem) is actually a classical Agreement problem.
It appears that any agreement problem can be seen as a particular instance of a more general problem, namely, the Consensus problem. In the Consensus problem, each process proposes a value, and all non-faulty processes have to agree on a single decision which has to be one of the proposed values. This chapter presents a few results associated with the Consensus problem. It is composed of seven sections. Section 2 de nes the Consensus problem. Section 3 studies Consensus in the Crash/no Recovery model. Section 4 discusses issues related to the communication channel semantics. Section 5 introduces the di erences between two main distributed computing models: (1) the Crash/no Recovery model, and (2) the Crash/Recovery model. Section 6 studies Consensus in the Crash/Recovery model, and Section 7 concludes the chapter. 2 The Consensus Problem
General Model
A distributed system is composed of a nite set of n sites interconnected through a communication network. Each site has a local memory (and possibly a stable storage according to the needs of applications) and executes one or more processes. To simplify and without loss of generality, we assume that there is only one process per site. Processes synchronize and communicate by exchanging messages through channels of the underlying network.
We consider asynchronous distributed systems: there are bounds neither on communication delays, nor on process speeds. The interest of the asynchronous model comes from its practicability. Open distributed systems such as systems covering large geographic areas, or systems subject to unpredictable loads that may be imposed by their users, are basically asynchronous due to the unpredictability of message transfer delays and process scheduling delays in those systems 2]. This makes the asynchronous model a very general model.
A process is either a good process or a bad process. What determines a process as being good or bad depends on the failure model. Section 3 and Section 6 provide instantiations of what is a good/bad process, in the Crash/no Recovery model and in the Crash/Recovery model, respectively. Roughly speaking, a good process is a process that behaves as expected. A bad process is a process that is not good. In both cases, a process is fail-silent: (1) until it crashes, a process behaves according to its speci cation, and (2) when crashed, it does nothing.
What is the Consensus Problem?
In the Consensus problem, de ned over a set fp 1 ; p 2 ; : : : ; p n g of processes, each process p i proposes initially a value v i , and all good processes have to decide on some common value v that is equal to one of the proposed values v i 3].
Formally, the Consensus problem is de ned in terms of two primitives: propose and decide.
When a process p i invokes propose(v i ), where v i is its proposal to the Consensus problem, we say that p i \proposes" v i . When p i invokes decide() and gets v as a result, we say that p i \decides" v.
The semantics of propose() and decide() is de ned by the following properties:
C-Termination. Every good process eventually decides. C-Agreement. No two good processes decide di erently.
C-Validity. If a process decides v, then v was proposed by some process.
While C-Termination de nes the liveness property associated with the Consensus problem, CAgreement and C-Validity de ne its safety properties. The C-Agreement property allows bad processes to decide di erently from good processes. This fact can be sometimes undesirable as it does not prevent a bad process to propagate a di erent decision throughout the system before crashing. In the Uniform Consensus problem, agreement is de ned by the following property:
C-Uniform-Agreement. No two processes (good or bad) decide di erently. which enforces the same decision on any process that decides. Actually, all Consensus algorithms discussed in this chapter solve the Uniform Consensus algorithm.
From an Agreement Problem to Consensus
When practical agreement problems have to be solved in real systems, a transformation is needed to bring them to the Consensus problem speci ed in the previous section. We illustrate below such a transformation on the Atomic Commitment problem. Transformation of other agreement problems to Consensus (e.g., Group Membership to Consensus, View Synchronous Communication to Consensus, Atomic Broadcast to Consensus, Atomic Multicast to Consensus) can be found in 3, 15, 17, 9, 21] . So Consensus can be viewed the common denominator of the di erent agreement problems. This explains the importance of Consensus, and justi es the large interest in the literature for this problem.
The Atomic Commitment Problem
As an example of agreement problem let us consider the Non-Blocking Atomic Commitment Problem. At the end of a computation, processes are required to enter a commitment protocol in order to commit their local computations (when things went well) or to abort them (when things went wrong). So, when it terminates its local computation each process has to vote yes or no. If for any reason (deadlock, storage problem, concurrency control con ict, local failure, etc) a process can not locally commit its local computation, it votes no. Otherwise a vote yes means that the process commits locally to make its updates permanent if it is required to do so. Based on these votes, the decision to commit or to abort is taken. The decision must be commit if things went well (all process are good and voted yes). It must be abort if things went wrong 10]. We consider here that a good process is a process that does not crash.
More formally, nbac in an asynchronous distributed system can be de ned by the following properties:
NBAC The justi cation property states that the \positive" outcome, namely commit, has to be justi ed: if the result is commit, it is because, for sure, things went well (i.e., all processes voted yes). Finally, the obligation property eliminates the trivial solution where the decision value would be abort even when the situation is satisfactory to commit.
Reducing Atomic Commit to Consensus
Actually the nbac is a particular instance of the Consensus problem. Figure 1 describes a simple protocol that reduces nbac to Consensus.
(1 3 The Crash/no Recovery Model
Good and Bad Processes
We consider here the Crash/no Recovery model. When a process crashes, it de nitely stops working. So, a good process is a process that never crashes. From a practical point of view, this means that a good process does not crash during the execution of the Consensus algorithm. A process that crashes is a bad process. Moreover, this section assumes that each pair of processes is connected by a reliable channel. Roughly speaking, a reliable channel ensures that no message is created, corrupted or duplicated by the channel, and that any good process eventually receives every message sent to it.
A Fundamental Impossibility Result
A fundamental result on the Consensus problem has been proved by Fischer, Lynch and Paterson 8]. This result states that it is impossible to design a deterministic Consensus algorithm in an asynchronous distributed system subject to (even) a single process crash failure.
The intuition that underlies this impossibility result lies in the impossibility, in an asynchronous distributed system, to safely distinguish between a crashed process and a very slow process or a process with which communications are very slow.
This impossibility result has been misunderstood by a large community of system implementors 16], but has challenged other researchers to nd a set of minimal assumptions that, when satis ed by an asynchronous distributed system, makes the Consensus problem solvable in this system. Minimal synchronism 5], partial synchrony 7] and unreliable failure detectors 3] constitute answers to this challenge. In this chapter, we consider the unreliable failure detectors formalism.
Unreliable Failure Detectors
The unreliable failure detectors formalism, introduced by Chandra and Toueg in 3], is a powerful abstraction for designing and building reliable distributed applications. Conceptually, a failure detector is a distributed oracle which provide processes with an approximate view of the process crashes occurring during the execution of the system. With respect to its structure, a failure detector is usually seen and used as a set of n, one per process, failure detectors modules. These modules are responsible for providing their associated processes with the set of processes they currently suspect to have crashed. When the failure detector module of process p i suspects p j to have crashed, we say that p i suspects p j .
Due to asynchrony, and consistently with the impossibility result of Section 3.2, is natural to expect the failure detector to make mistakes: it may not suspect a bad (crashed) process or, erroneously suspect a good one. However, to be useful, failure detectors have to eventually provide some correct information about process crashes during the execution and thus, their mistakes are typically bounded by a completeness and an accuracy properties. The completeness property requires bad processes to be eventually suspected, and accuracy restricts the erroneous suspicions of good processes. Combining di erent de nitions for the completeness and accuracy properties, several classes of failure detectors can be de ned 3]. In the following we consider the class of Eventual Strong failure detectors, which is denoted by 3S and de ned by:
Strong completeness: Eventually every bad process is permanently suspected by every good process. Eventual weak accuracy: Eventually some good process is never suspected by any good process. Note that, in practice, strong completeness can be easily satis ed using \I am alive" messages and timeouts. On the other hand, even if eventual weak accuracy is satis ed by some system executions, there is no way to guarantee that it will be satis ed by all system executions. This observation shows the limit of asynchronous systems subject to process crashes, as far as crash detection is concerned: there is no mean to ensure safe process crash detection. Ultimately, such a detection can be at best approximate.
Consensus Algorithms Based on Unreliable Failure Detectors
The rst Consensus algorithm designed to work with a failure detector belonging the class 3S was proposed by Chandra and Toueg 3]. Since then, other algorithms based on 3S have been proposed: one of them has been proposed by Schiper 26] It is possible that not all processes decide in the same round, depending on the pattern of process crashes and on the pattern of failure suspicions that occur during the execution. One important point which di erentiates the algorithms is the way they solve this issue, while ensuring that there is a single decision value (i.e., without violating the agreement property of Consensus).
Other di erences between these Consensus algorithms lie in the message exchange pattern they generate and in the way they use the information provided by the failure detectors. ChandraToueg's algorithm is based on a centralized scheme: during a round all messages are from (to) the current round coordinator to (from) the other processes. In Schiper's and Hur n-Raynal's algorithms, the message exchange pattern is decentralized: the current coordinator broadcasts its current estimate to all processes, and then those cooperate in a decentralized way to establish a decision value. An important di erence between Schiper's algorithm and Hur n-Raynal's algorithm is the way each algorithm behaves with respect to failure suspicions. Basically, a design principle of Schiper's algorithm is not to trust the failure detector: a majority of processes must suspect the current coordinator to allow a process to proceed to the next round, and to consider another coordinator. Di erently, a basic design principle of Hur n-Raynal's algorithm is to trust the failure detector. Consequently, Hur n-Raynal's algorithm is particularly e cient when the failure detector is reliable. Schiper's algorithm resists in a better way to failure detectors' mistakes.
What makes these algorithms far from being trivial is the fact that they can tolerate an unbounded number of incorrect failure suspicions, while ensuring the agreement property of the Consensus problem. This is particularly important from a practical point of view, as it allows to de ne aggressive time-out values, that might be met only whenever the system is stable, without having the risk of violating the agreement property during unstable periods of the system. Finally, the algorithms satisfy the validity and agreement properties of Consensus despite the number of bad processes in the system, and satisfy termination whenever a majority of processes are good and the failure detector is of class 3S.
Other Fundamental Results
Three important results are associated with the class 3S of failure detectors:
Chandra, Hadzilacos and Toueg 4] showed that the 3S class is the weakest class of failure detectors allowing to solve Consensus. This indicates that, as far as the detection of process crashes is concerned, the properties de ned by 3S constitute the borderline beyond which the Consensus problem can not be solved. Chandra and Toueg 3] proved that a majority of processes must be good (i.e., must not crash) to solve Consensus using failure detectors of the 3S class.
Guerraoui 11] proved that any algorithm that solves Consensus using failure detectors of the class 3S, also solves Uniform Consensus.
About Channel Semantics
The algorithms mentioned in Section 3 assume reliable channels 3, 1 . An eventual reliable channel is reliable only if both the sender and the receiver of a message are good processes. Implementation of eventual reliable channels is straightforward. Messages are bu ered by the sender, and retransmitted until they are acknowledged by the receiver. However, what happens if the destination process crashes? If the system is equipped with a perfect failure detector (a failure detector that does not make mistakes), then the sender stops retransmitting messages once it learns that the receiver has crashed. If the failure detector is unreliable, the sender has to retransmit messages forever, which might require unbounded bu er space! Fortunately, a weaker channel semantics, called stubborn channels, is su cient for solving Consensus 12]. Roughly speaking, a k-stubborn channel retransmits only the k most recent messages sent through it. Contrary to reliable channels or eventual reliable channels, a stubborn channel may lose messages if the sender is a good process. It is shown in 12] that Consensus can be solved with 1-stubborn channels and 3S failure detectors, and that the required bu er space is logarithmically bounded by the number of rounds of the algorithm. Being able to solve Consensus in the Crash/no Recovery model with lossy channels is a rst step towards solving Consensus in the Crash/Recovery model (Section 6). Indeed, solving Consensus in the Crash/Recovery model, among other di culties requires to cope with the loss of messages. To illustrate the problem consider a message m sent by p i to p j and that p j crashes and may afterwards recover from the crash. If m arrives at p j while p j is crashed, then p j cannot receive m, i.e., m is lost. If p j never recovers then the loss of m is not a problem. This is no more the case if p j eventually recovers. Notice that in this case the loss of m is not the fault of the channel. However, the reason for the loss of the message does not make any di erence for the Consensus algorithm.
5 Crash/no Recovery Model vs Crash/Recovery Model While in Section 2 we have de ned one instance of the Consensus problem, in a real system Consensus is a problem that has to be solved multiple times. Solving multiple instances of the Consensus problem is called Repeated Consensus. Repeated Consensus allows us to clarify the di erence between the Crash/no Recovery model and the Crash/Recovery model.
In the context of Repeated Consensus, let us consider instance #k of the Consensus problem.
In the Crash/no Recovery model a process p i that crashes while solving Consensus #k is excluded forever from Consensus #k, even if p i recovers before Consensus #k is solved 2 . Notice that this does not prevent process p i from learning the decision of Consensus #k, neither does this prevent p i from taking part in Consensus #(k + 1). In contrast, in the Crash/Recovery model a process p i that crashes while solving Consensus #k remains allowed to take part in Consensus #k after its recovery. Of course, this helps only if Consensus #k is not yet solved when p i recovers. This is typically the case whenever the crash of p i prevents the other processes from solving Consensus #k.
As an example, consider a Consensus algorithm that requires a majority of processes to take part in the algorithm (let us call such an algorithm Maj-C-Algorithm), and the case in which three processes (n = 3) have to solve Consensus #k. If we assume that no more than one single process crashes during the execution of Consensus #k, a Maj-C-Algorithm based on the Crash/no Recovery model is perfectly adequate. However, if we admit now that more than one process crashes, Consensus #k is not solvable with a Maj-C-Algorithm based on the Crash/no Recovery model. Such an algorithm leads the whole system to block whenever a majority of processes crash: (1) the surviving process cannot solve Consensus alone, (2) waiting for the recovery of the crashed processes would not help, and (3) if Consensus #k cannot be solved, none of the subsequent instances of Consensus #(k + 1), #(k + 2), etc., will ever be launched.
To overcome the above situation, an algorithm based on the Crash/Recovery model is required. With such an algorithm, the assumption of failure free processes can be released and processes that recover are allowed to actively participate in the instance of Consensus being currently solved. These advantages have certainly a price: apart from the issue of message loss (Section 4), appropriate failure detectors have to be de ned, and stable storage becomes necessary. 6 The Crash/Recovery Model
Good and Bad Processes
In the Crash/Recovery model, according to their crash patterns, processes can be classi ed into four categories: NC processes that never crash. 2 This can easily been achieved making pi to exclude itself from actively participate in the algorithm upon recovery.
ENC processes that eventually recover and no longer crash EO processes that crash and recover in nitely often. EC processes that eventually crash and no longer recover.
Particularly di erent from the process classi cation in the Crash/no Recovery model is the EO set of processes. These processes inde nitely oscillate between up and down periods and, due to the asynchrony of the model (which makes no assumptions regarding process speeds), one may be tempted to consider EO processes entirely capable of contributing to the computation of a decision value. However, because such a process is in nitely often down, and due to the unpredictability of the crash and communication patterns occurring during an execution, it is possible that the process is down whenever a message is delivered to it. This scenario renders the process unable to receive any message addressed to it and therefore incapable to contribute to the progression of the algorithm.
From the above categories, good processes are those in the NC and ENC sets, and bad processes those in the EO and EC sets. From a practical point of view, the good processes are the processes that are eventually up during a long enough period of time to allow Consensus to be solved. Bad processes are either eventually crashed forever, or are never up long enough to allow Consensus to be solved. As in the Crash/no Recovery model, the relevant period during which process crashes are observed spans only the execution of the Consensus algorithm.
Failure Detection
Solving Consensus in the Crash/Recovery model requires the de nition of appropriate failure detectors. From a practical point of view, it is unreasonable to assume failure detectors satisfying strong completeness (such as those in the 3S class) in the presence of processes that crash and recover in nitely often (processes in the EO set) 3 . Recall that strong completeness requires good processes to eventually suspect bad processes permanently which would imply to safely 4 eventually distinguish between ENC and EO processes. Since there is no bound for the number of times a ENC process may crash and recover, this distinction would mean predicting the crash pattern of the process.
For the Crash/Recovery model we consider the 3S r class of failure detectors de ned in 23]. 3S r di ers from 3S in the completeness property. Any failure detector of class 3S r satis es Eventual weak accuracy and Recurrent strong completeness: Every bad process is in nitely often suspected by every good process.
As with 3S failure detectors, completeness can be realized by using \I am alive" messages and timeouts for detecting EC processes. Detecting EO processes however requires a di erent scheme.
It can be accomplished by having each process to broadcast a \I recovered" message each time the process recovers from a crash. It is worth to notice that these monitoring messages are handled by each process failure detector module which is part of the process and thus subject to its crash pattern. 3 In 6], the de ned Crash/Recovery model does not consider EO processes which allows the adoption of 3S failure detectors.
Finally, it should be noted that due to the absence of an eventually stable sequence of values from 3S r failure detectors regarding the suspicion of EO processes, the output of the failure detector module has to be adequately de ned so that the sequence of values perceived by the algorithm also satis es recurrent strong completeness.
Stable Storage
In practice, processes have their state on local volatile memory whose contents is lost in the event of a crash. To overcome this loss and to be able to restore their state when recovering from crashes processes need to be provided with some sort of stable storage.
Access to stable storage is usually a source of ine ciency and should be avoided as possible. Therefore, a pertinent question is whether can Consensus be solved in the Crash/Recovery model without using stable storage at all? This question has been answered by Aguilera, Chen and Toueg 1] who have proved that, Consensus can be solved without using stable storage provided that the number of processes that never crash (jNCj) is greater than the number of bad processes (jEO ECj).
This result shows that, even without resorting to stable storage, it is possible to solve Consensus in the presence of transient process crashes (with complete loss of state) which otherwise, with algorithms designed for the Crash/no Recovery model, would not be tolerated. On the other hand, allowing any good process to crash and recover at least once, requires processes to periodically log critical data. When and what data needs to be logged obviously depends on each particular algorithm. Critical process data that has invariably to be persistent to crashes is that contributing to the a decision, that is, data which re ects a championed or detracted proposed estimate of the decision.
Algorithms
Algorithms for solving Consensus in the Crash/Recovery model without requiring stable storage have been proposed in 1]. These algorithms are bound to the results on the requirements of stable storage (Section 6.3) and thus, to terminate, require the number of processes that never crash to be greater than the number of bad processes (jNCj > jEO ECj).
Several Consensus algorithms releasing the assumption of processes that never crash (NC) have been proposed in 22, 1, 20] . In practice, albeit the cost of using stable storage, these algorithms are better suited for the Crash/Recovery model as they tolerate the crash and recovery of any process, and allow any recovering process to actively take part of the computation.
These algorithms borrow their design principles from the Consensus algorithms for the Crash/no Recovery model 3, 26, 19] . All algorithms require a majority of good processes and rely on the semantics of stubborn communication channels. Apart from their structure, their major di erences lie in the failure detectors they assume and on the use processes make of stable storage. The algorithms of Oliveira, Guerraoui and Schiper 22] and Hur n, Mostefaoui and Raynal 20] were designed using failure detectors satisfying strong completeness and can be proved correct with failure detectors satisfying Recurrent strong completeness 23]. The algorithm of Aguilera, Chen and Toueg 1] uses a hybrid failure detector which satis es strong completeness regarding EC processes and handles the detection of EO processes by providing an estimate count of the number of recoveries of all processes.
With regards to stable storage, these algorithms all require each process to log critical data in every round. The algorithm in 20] is particularly e cient since stable storage is accessed at most once during a round.
Conclusion
The Consensus problem is a fundamental problem one has to solve when building reliable asynchronous distributed systems. This chapter has focused on the de nition of Consensus and its solution in two models: the Crash/no Recovery model and the more realistic Crash/Recovery model. Theoretical results associated with Consensus have also been presented. A fundamental point in the study of the Consensus problem lies in the Non-Blocking property. An algorithm is non-blocking if the good (non-faulty) processes are able to terminate the algorithm execution despite bad (faulty) processes. The termination property of the Consensus problem is a non-blocking property. From a theoretical point of view, there are two main results associated with the Consensus problem. The rst is due to Fischer, Lynch and Paterson who proved that there is no deterministic non-blocking Consensus algorithm in a fully asynchronous distributed system. The second one is due to to Chandra, Hadzilacos and Toueg who have exhibited the minimal failure detector properties (namely, 3S) for solving the non-blocking Consensus problem with a deterministic algorithm. From a practical point of view, it is important to understand the central role played by the Consensus problem when building reliable distributed systems.
